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Illusory Due Process: The Broken Student
Loan Hearing System
Deanne Loonin*
Student loan collection hearings should be the primary gateway to relief for borrowers in
default, but the system is profoundly broken. The author presents case examples, available
data, and responses from industry surveys to describe how student loan collection hearings offer
no more than an illusion of due process. The later sections present reform proposals to improve
the existing hearing system, including eliminating private contractor outsourcing and increasing
government accountability and oversight. Recognizing that it is counterproductive to try to fix
the hearing process without tackling systemic issues, the final section includes a summary of
broad reform measures aimed at ending the current debt-fueled federal student aid system.

* Attorney and advocate for student loan borrowers, including as an attorney at the Legal Services
Center at Harvard Law School’s Project on Predatory Student Lending, and as the former Director of
the National Consumer Law Center’s Student Loan Borrower Assistance Project. Special thanks to
Elizabeth Renuart and Maggie O’Grady for providing valuable insights and comments on earlier drafts
of this article and to industry contacts for their assistance. Thanks also to the Student Borrower
Protection Center for its support. For inspiration to keep fighting for student borrowers and their
families, I thank my colleagues at the Project on Predatory Student Lending and our clients who are
trying to improve their lives while so unfairly bearing the burdens of our country’s broken student aid
system. The author is solely responsible for the content of this Article.
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INTRODUCTION
There are currently about forty-three million federal student loan borrowers
with outstanding federal student loan debt of $1.5 trillion.1 A shocking number of
these borrowers are struggling with repayment, with many sinking into default.2
Although student loan debt burdens impact all sectors of society, low-income
borrowers and borrowers of color suffer disproportionately.3 Other groups
1. Teddy Nykiel, 2019 Student Loan Debt Statistics, NERDWALLET (Dec. 20, 2019),
https://www.nerdwallet.com/article/loans/student-loans/student-loan-debt [ https://perma.cc/
D4LF-WYHS ]; Scott Jaschik, Outstanding Student Loan Portfolio Now Tops $1.5 Trillion,
INSIDE HIGHER ED ( Jan. 6, 2020),
https://www.insidehighered.com/quicktakes/2020/01/06/
outstanding-student-loan-portfolio-now-tops-15-trillion [ https://perma.cc/L3KU-RKFY ].
2. According to a 2019 study, one-quarter of all student loan borrowers defaulted over a
twenty-year period, including about half of all African American borrowers and a third of Latinx
borrowers. LAURA SULLIVAN, TATJANA MESCHEDE, THOMAS SHAPIRO & FERNANDA ESCOBAR,
INST. ON ASSETS & SOC. POL’Y, STALLING DREAMS: HOW STUDENT DEBT IS DISRUPTING LIFE
CHANCES AND WIDENING THE RACIAL WEALTH GAP (2019), https://heller.brandeis.edu/iasp/pdfs/
racial-wealth-equity/racial-wealth-gap/stallingdreams-how-student-debt-is-disrupting-lifechances.pdf
[ https://perma.cc/N56X-KEF3 ].
3. For example, African American students are far more likely to borrow than their white peers
(seventy-eight percent vs. fifty-seven percent) and to default on those loans (forty-nine percent
vs. twenty-one percent). Ben Miller, New Federal Data Show a Student Loan Crisis for African American
Borrowers, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Oct. 16, 2017, 9:00 AM), https://
www.americanprogress.org/issues/education-postsecondary/news/2017/10/16/440711/new-federaldata-show-student-loan-crisis-african-american-borrowers/
[ https://perma.cc/Y3AU-9BWE ].

First to Printer_Loonin_TW Edits.docx (Do Not Delete)

2020]

ILLUSORY DUE PROCESS

10/26/20 2:01 PM

175

particularly burdened by student loan default include veterans, first-generation
college students, students without traditional high school diplomas, and students
with disabilities.4
This Article focuses on struggling borrowers and their experiences seeking
relief through the student loan collection hearing process. These hearings, in theory,
allow borrowers facing collection to raise claims and defenses, including challenges
to loan enforceability. The hearings should be the primary gateway to relief for
borrowers in default. Instead, as described in this Article, the hearings offer no more
than an illusion of due process.
By allowing the broken hearing system to continue, the government has
effectively eliminated an essential pathway to relief for borrowers facing default.
This hits borrowers particularly hard because of the broad and long-lasting
consequences of default. Our current federal student loan system is extraordinarily
punitive, more so than other federal and private debt collection programs.5 The
government can garnish a borrower’s wages without a judgment, seize tax refunds
(even earned income tax credits), and portions of federal payments such as Social
Security, all without a statute of limitations.6 In addition to facing collection,
students in default lose the ability to restart their educations through new federal
loans or grants and may even have their academic transcripts withheld.7 These
policies prevent individuals from getting a fresh start and hammer students who do
not succeed the first time around.8 These financial burdens of debt inhibit our
country’s ability to achieve its higher education goals but so do the psychological
burdens. Borrowers can end up carrying student debt burdens throughout their
lives, impacting not only their own futures but next generations as well.9
It should not be surprising that the government generally uses its powerful
extrajudicial collection tools rather than expending the time and resources to sue a
borrower in court.10 From July through September 2018, the Department of
Students who identify as American Indian or Alaska Native and Hispanic or Latino students also default
in rates higher than national averages. Colleen Campbell, The Forgotten Faces of Student Loan Default,
CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Oct. 16, 2018, 9:45 AM), https://www.americanprogress.org/
issues/education-postsecondary/news/2018/10/16/459394/forgotten-faces-student-loan-default/
[ https://perma.cc/R4XM-HCJC ].
4. Campbell, supra note 3.
5. See Deanne Loonin & Julie Margetta Morgan, Aiming Higher: Looking Beyond Completion to
Restore the Promise of Higher Education, 48 J.L. & EDUC. 423, 435 (2019).
6. DEANNE LOONIN, ABBY SHAFROTH & PERSIS YU, STUDENT LOAN LAW § 8.5.3 (Nat’l
Consumer Law Ctr. ed., 6th ed. 2019); 20 U.S.C. § 1095a (eliminating the statute of limitations).
7. THE INST. FOR COLL. ACCESS & SUCCESS, THE SELF-DEFEATING CONSEQUENCES OF
STUDENT LOAN DEFAULT 2 (2018), https://ticas.org/wp-content/uploads/legacy-files/pub_files/
ticas_default_issue_brief.pdf [ https://perma.cc/78RS-GF9T ].
8. Loonin & Morgan, supra note 5, at 447.
9. See, e.g., Adam Harris, The Lifelong Cost of Getting a For-Profit Education, ATLANTIC
(Aug.
29,
2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2018/08/for-profit-collegestudents-are-saddled-with-debt-they-cant-pay-back/568834/ [ https://perma.cc/W6QE-WMXS ].
10. The Department of Education does, however, sue in some cases. These cases are
disproportionally concentrated in areas that are home to communities of color. MARGARET MATTES
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Education’s (the Department) collection agencies seized almost $230 million in
wages from borrowers in default.11 This was about nine percent of all collections.12
Most borrowers in garnishment persist in that status for at least five to ten years.13
In theory, most struggling borrowers should be able to find some relief
through an array of programs ranging from affordable and flexible repayment plans
to discharges for disability or school-related fraud.14 The school-related fraud
discharge category includes a right to “borrower defense,” an assertion that the loan
is void or unenforceable because of school misconduct.15
Borrowers generally must affirmatively apply for these various relief
programs.
This Article highlights the importance of student loan collection hearings as a
pathway to relief for borrowers and the range of ways in which the program is
broken. Part II describes the legal framework of the student loan collection hearing
system. Part III presents the reality of the borrower hearing experience and how the
government offers no more than an illusion of due process. Part IV summarizes the
doctrine of inherently governmental functions and how it developed to address the
risks of privatization of critical government functions. This Part also discusses the
prevalence of private contractor involvement in the student loan collection hearing
system, concluding that these hearing functions should be classified as inherently
governmental functions. This is followed by a discussion in Part V of the problems
with government administration of the hearing process and lack of accountability.
The last two sections present reform proposals starting with ways to improve the
existing system in Part VI. Recognizing that it is counterproductive to try to fix the
hearing process without tackling systemic issues, the final section includes a

& PERSIS YU, NAT’L CONSUMER L. CTR., INEQUITABLE JUDGMENTS: EXAMINING RACE AND
FEDERAL STUDENT LOAN COLLECTION LAWSUITS (2019),
https://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/
student_loans/report-inequitable-judgments-april2019.pdf [ https://perma.cc/9ZRV-PX5G ].
11. The Department publishes recovery rates for each collection agency, broken into categories
for total collection, consolidation, rehabilitation, voluntary payments, and garnishment. There is not a
separate category for non-garnishment involuntary collection. Default Rates, FED. STUDENT AID,
https://studentaid.gov/data-center/student/default [ https://perma.cc/Z3UF-S383 ] ( last visited
Oct. 3, 2020 ). There is also publicly available data by type of collection, including offset, for the now
defunct guaranteed loan program (also known as “FFEL”). For the 2019 fiscal year through June,
FFEL garnishment comprised nearly 7% of total FFEL loan collections, amounting to close to $380
million seized from borrowers. Treasury offsets comprised 6.2% of FFEL loan collections, equaling
just over $340 million. FFEL Program Lender and Guaranty Agency Reports, FED. STUDENT AID,
https://studentaid.gov/data-center/lender-guaranty [ https://perma.cc/G4S6-3LY7 ] ( last visited
Oct. 3, 2020 ) (June 2019 results).
12. Id.
13. AnnaMaria Andriotis, Student Debt Takes a Bite Out of More Paychecks, WALL ST. J. ( June
13, 2014, 6:52 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/student-debt-takes-a-bite-out-of-more-paychecks1402699974 [ https://perma.cc/D2VE-EFVD ].
14. See generally LOONIN, SHAFROTH & YU, supra note 6.
15. 20 U.S.C. § 1087e(h); 34 C.F.R. § 685.222 (2020) (setting forth borrower defenses to Direct
Loans). For information about borrower defenses for FFEL loans, see LOONIN, SHAFROTH & YU,
supra note 6, § 10.6.4.3.
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summary of broad reform measures aimed at ending the current debt-fueled federal
student aid system.
I. LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF THE STUDENT LOAN COLLECTION
HEARING PROCESS
The statutory authority for student loan collection hearings differs depending
on the type of loan and type of collection action. Since 2010, the government
originates nearly all federal loans through the Direct Loan program.16 However,
there are still a large percentage of outstanding loans from the older guaranteed loan
program, also known as the Federal Family Education Loan program or FFEL.17
Before submitting a debt to the Department of Treasury for tax or benefits
offset, the Department of Education must certify that the debt is legally
enforceable.18 For FFEL loans, the Department delegates to guaranty agencies the
authority to initiate tax offsets for loans still held by the guaranty agency.19
With respect to garnishment, the government can seize up to fifteen percent
of a defaulted borrower’s disposable pay.20 The FFEL process largely mirrors the
Direct Loan process with a few important exceptions. For example, the garnishment
authority for FFEL is in the Higher Education Act (HEA).21 In contrast, the
government authority for garnishment of Direct Loans is derived from the Debt
Collection Improvement Act (DCIA).22
For both the Direct Loan and FFEL programs, the statute and regulations
describe notice requirements, deadlines for borrower hearing requests, and minimal
criteria for hearing officers. There is also informal guidance on the hearing process,
not all of which is publicly available.23
There are deadlines for requesting hearings. For tax offset, in order to have
the borrower’s objections to tax offset considered, the borrower must file a request
16. In the Direct Loan program, the government, through the Department of Education,
directly originates student loans.
17. As of January 2020, the Direct Loan portfolio represented eighty-two percent of the federal
student loan total, with FFEL at seventeen percent. Jaschik, supra note 1.
18. 31 U.S.C. § 3720A(b); 31 C.F.R. § 285.2(d)(1)(i) (2020); 31 C.F.R. § 285.5(b), (d)(5) (2020).
“Legally enforceable” means there has been a final agency determination that the debt, in the amount
stated, is due, and there are no legal bars to collection by offset. 31 C.F.R. § 285.5(b).
19. 31 U.S.C. § 3720A(a). Guaranty agencies are state or private nonprofit organizations that
had agreements with the Department of Education to administer a loan guarantee program under the
Higher Education Act. 34 C.F.R. § 682.200 (2020) (containing FFEL program definitions).
20. 31 U.S.C. § 3720D(b)(1).
21. 20 U.S.C § 1095a.
22. 31 U.S.C. § 3720D.
23. The Department provides instructions to collection agencies, including for offset and
garnishment, in a handbook that is not publicly available. A redacted version from May 2016, obtained
through a National Consumer Law Center (NCLC) Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request, is
posted online. FED. STUDENT AID, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., PCA PROCEDURES MANUAL FOR PRIVATE
COLLECTION AGENCIES CONTRACTED BY FEDERAL STUDENT AID (2016)
[ hereinafter
PCA
HANDBOOK ], https://www.studentloanborrowerassistance.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/pcamanual.pdf [ https://perma.cc/86BN-UKBC ].
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for review by the later of sixty-five days after the date of the notice or fifteen days
after the borrower’s loan file is provided if the borrower exercises the right to
request the loan file.24 The timely request for a hearing stops the offset until the
hearing—and any further requests for review—have been exhausted.25 The
government is not required to do so but has discretion to provide hearings for
borrowers requesting them after these deadlines have expired.26 There are similar
rules and authority for federal benefits offset with a few variations. For example,
borrowers facing benefits offsets have fewer days to request hearings.27
The timing rules are slightly different for garnishment. If the borrower
requests a hearing on or before the thirtieth day after the mailing date of the notice
of garnishment, the garnishment should not proceed until after the hearing.28
Borrowers can still request hearings after that date—and regulations provide that
the Department must still provide a hearing following an untimely request—but
garnishment may proceed pending a hearing decision.29
Unlike offset, there are rules regarding deadlines for issuance of garnishment
decisions.30 The Department is required to issue a written decision no later than
sixty days after receiving the request for hearing.31 If this deadline is not met, the
Department must not issue a garnishment order until a hearing is held and
decision rendered.32
Borrowers may request oral hearings for both offset and garnishment but must
submit the reasons why a review based only on the written submission would be
insufficient.33 For Department-held loans, the Department has discretion whether
to grant an oral hearing.34 In contrast, the FFEL garnishment regulations provide
the borrower with the option of choosing an oral or written hearing.35

24. 34 C.F.R. § 30.33(d)(1) (2020).
25. 31 U.S.C. § 3720A(b).
26. 34 C.F.R. § 30.24(c) (2020).
27. Id. § 30.24(a)(1).
28. 31 U.S.C. § 3720D(c)(1). The statute provides fifteen days, but the regulations state thirty.
34 C.F.R. § 34.11(a)(1) (2020). The Department’s website also states a deadline of thirty days. If You
Default on Your Federal Student Loan, the Loan May Be Placed with a Collection Agency, Which Will
Then Contact You to Obtain Payment, FED. STUDENT AID [ hereinafter Collections ],
https://studentaid.gov/manage-loans/default/collections [ https://perma.cc/EZY6-43PV ] ( last
visited Oct. 3, 2020 ). Hereafter, the citations to garnishment are all for the Direct Loan program.
29. 31 U.S.C. § 3720D(c)(2); 34 C.F.R. § 34.11(c).
30. For offset, the regulations for oral hearings do not include a deadline for decisions, but the
regulations provide that the government must avoid unreasonable delays in the proceedings. 34
C.F.R. § 30.26(c)(2) (2020).
31. 34 C.F.R. § 34.16(a) (2020).
32. Id. § 34.16(b).
33. 34 C.F.R. § 30.25(b) (2020) (addressing offset); 34 C.F.R. § 34.9(a) (2020)
(addressing garnishment).
34. 34 C.F.R. § 34.9 (addressing garnishment); 34 C.F.R. § 30.25 (addressing offset).
35. 34 C.F.R. § 682.410(b)(9)(i)(E)(2) (2020).
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Borrowers may request hearings and raise claims or defenses regarding the
existence, amount, enforceability, or past-due status of the debt.36 For garnishment,
borrowers may also raise a defense if they have been continuously employed less
than twelve months after involuntary separation from employment.37 The request
for hearing forms list these claims and defenses, including the various statutory
discharges such as closed school, false certification, and borrower defense.38
Borrowers may also provide evidence at a hearing to prove that continued
collection would cause a financial hardship. A successful hardship claim does not
discharge or cancel the debt, but instead results in a temporary suspension of
collection. The garnishment regulations specifically include a right to raise hardship
to reduce or suspend collection.39 The Department has developed an administrative
wage garnishment calculator for its contractors to use in making hardship
determinations.40 In contrast, review based on financial hardship is not explicitly
granted in the offset regulations. However, the Department and guaranty agencies
have discretion to consider hardship claims for borrowers facing offset.41
II. THE REALITY OF STUDENT LOAN COLLECTION HEARINGS
A. Hearing Volume and Outcomes
This Section and the following sections present findings from the limited
public information that is available about hearings, including information from
various Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests, a survey of industry
36. 31 U.S.C. § 3720A(b)(2) (stating the agency must give an opportunity for borrowers facing
offset to present evidence that debt is not past due or not legally enforceable); 34 C.F.R. § 30.22(b)(3)(ii)
(2020) (addressing review of existence or amount of debt); 34 C.F.R. § 30.33(b)(3)(ii) (2020) (addressing
review of existence, amount, enforceability, or past due status for tax offsets); 31 U.S.C. § 3720D(b)(5)
(stating that the agency must give borrowers facing garnishment an opportunity for a hearing
concerning the existence or amount of the debt); 34 C.F.R. § 34.6(c)(1) (2020) (addressing garnishment
hearings on existence, amount, or current enforceability).
37. 31 U.S.C. § 3720D(b)(6); 34 C.F.R. § 34.6(c)(3).
38. The Department does not include these forms in its online library. Repayment Forms,
FED. STUDENT AID, https://studentaid.gov/app/formLibrary.action?_ga=2.205759639.542323583.
1532996021-1879680736.1424704777 [ https://perma.cc/XQS7-V3L7 ] ( last visited Oct. 3, 2020 ).
Recent hearing forms, however, are available on the National Consumer Law Center’s Student Loan
Borrower Assistance website, Federal Student Loan Forms, STUDENT LOAN BORROWER ASSISTANCE,
https://www.studentloanborrowerassistance.org/resources/important-forms/
[ https://perma.cc/
G6XV-MMEG ] ( last visited Oct. 3, 2020), and in the PCA Procedures Manual, PCA HANDBOOK,
supra note 23.
39. 34 C.F.R. §§ 34.24–34.25 (2020).
40. PCA HANDBOOK, supra note 23, at 7.0 app. A (Administrative Wage Garnishment (AWG)
Hardship Calculator Supplemental Instructions).
41. Loan Servicing and Collection - Frequently Asked Questions, FED. STUDENT AID
TOP-Q1, https://ifap.ed.gov/loan-servicing-and-collection-frequently-asked-questions#TOP-Q1
[ https://perma.cc/TUF9-D6P2 ] ( last visited Oct. 3, 2020 ). The Department has also posted a Social
Security offset package for borrowers. FED. STUDENT AID, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., REQUEST TO
STOP OR REDUCE OFFSET OF SOCIAL SECURITY BENEFITS, https://ifap.ed.gov/sites/default/files/
attachments/2019-09/ReqStopReduceOffsetSocSecBenefits.pdf [ https://perma.cc/9LCM-Y3DW ]
( last visited Oct. 3, 2020 ).
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participants, and advocates’ experiences representing borrowers. The responses to
the industry survey demonstrate how difficult it is to accurately track the actual
borrower experience. Most of the companies responding to the industry survey
either did not track hearing volume and outcome information at all or did not make
the information public.42
There is, however, some information from a redacted version of the
Department’s 2013 contract with the debt management and collections system
contractor Maximus.43 The contract states that Maximus should expect 17,000
garnishment hearings annually and nearly 6,000 annual offset hearings.44 In a
separate 2015 FOIA response, the Department reported a total of 45,017
garnishment hearings during the time period from January 2012 through May 2015,
or approximately 1,097 each month.45 This is less than the 17,000 annual hearings
the Department set as an expectation for Maximus in the 2013 contract.46
The Department has published data showing hearing volume from earlier
years for FFEL garnishments. In calendar year 2011, the Department estimated that
there were 84,293 FFEL program borrowers whose loans were held by state
guaranty agencies and for which the guaranty agency initiated administrative wage
garnishment.47 The number was 159,912 for nonprofit guaranty agencies.48 For
both types of guaranty agencies, the Department estimated that ten percent of
42. The author sent a list of questions about student loan collection hearings to an industry
contact in 2016. This contact distributed the questions to servicing and collection companies that all
had some involvement with the hearing process. The industry contact collected the responses and sent
them to the author. The responses were color coded by the type of agency/company, but without
identifying the names of the companies. E-mail from author to industry contact (May 31, 2016, 11:45
EST) [ hereinafter Industry Survey ] (on file with author). The author separately contacted a private
servicer/collector with the same list of questions. A total of five companies responded, including four
from the industry contact and the one that the author contacted separately. The companies responding
to the industry survey included one large and one small state-based guaranty agency, one large and one
small nonprofit guaranty agency, and one private servicer/collector. The company that the author
contacted separately reviewed its 2016 responses in 2019 and stated that they were still accurate. The
industry contact, also in 2019, checked back with a number of agencies administering FFEL hearings
and reported to the author that the agencies did not believe that there were changes since the 2016
responses. All respondents requested anonymity. A redacted set of responses with no company
identification information is on file with the author.
43. The NCLC obtained a redacted copy of the Department’s debt management and collections
system contract with Maximus. FOIA Request No. 18-001-49 F [ hereinafter Maximus Contract ]. The
Department’s response is dated November 8, 2018. Letter from Dep’t of Educ., to Nat’l Consumer
L. Ctr. (Nov. 8, 2018) (on file with NCLC).
44. Maximus Contract, supra note 43, at 23 app. 3 (DMCS Volumes).
45. Letter from Larry Schwartztol, Am. C.L. Union, and Persis Yu, Nat’l Consumer L. Ctr., to
U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Request Under Freedom of Information Act (May 7, 2015) [ hereinafter ACLU
& NCLC ], https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/2015.05.07_aclu_nclc_foia_to_
dept_ed.pdf [ https://perma.cc/5G27-DW3Y ]. In the final response to the FOIA request, the
Department provided data through September 2015, adjusting the total number of hearings to 47,484
(or approximately 1,055 each month).
46. Maximus Contract, supra note 43.
47. Administrative Wage Garnishment (AWG)—Use of Third-Party Contractors, 78
Fed. Reg. 65768, 65794–95 (Nov. 1, 2013).
48. Id.

First to Printer_Loonin_TW Edits.docx (Do Not Delete)

2020]

ILLUSORY DUE PROCESS

10/26/20 2:01 PM

181

borrowers for which garnishment was initiated would request hearings.49 One of
the industry respondents in the industry survey estimated a lower percentage, stating
that about five percent of its student loan customers receive hearing notices
request hearings.50
The low hearing request rate is cause for concern because hearings are of little
value if borrowers do not know about them or request them.51 Any deterrent effect
on future bad acts is also unlikely with such low usage rates.52
Only one of the agencies in our survey provided some data on garnishment
hearing volume and outcomes. This large state-based guaranty agency provided
information for calendar year 2015 regarding garnishment hearings. According to
the agency’s response, of 4,710 hearings requested, most (eighty-six percent, or
4,042) were cancelled and no garnishment occurred.53 The agency did not state the
reason for cancellation in these cases.54 Further, the agency stated only that the
garnishment was cancelled, not the underlying debt. This indicates that there was
no final discharge of the loan in these cases and presumably the borrowers remained
in default.55 Of the 4,710 hearings requested, hearings were held in only about
fourteen percent of the cases (668 hearings).56 Of the 668 hearings, about
thirty-nine percent resulted in full garnishment orders and thirty-four percent in
partial garnishment orders. In twenty-six percent of cases where hearings were held,
the agency and borrower agreed to a settlement and no garnishment occurred.57
These settlements may have cancelled the debt, but the agency was not clear about
this and did not respond to further inquiry.58 In general, this agency did not track
by substantive defense raised.
In a 2015 FOIA response, the Department provided data on objections
borrowers raised in hearing requests.59 However, the Department acknowledged
numerous problems with the data including overlap between different categories,
leading to double counting of some results.60 It is nearly impossible to determine
from the responses whether the Department considered substantive defenses when
49. Id.
50. Industry Survey, supra note 42.
51. Vicki Lens, Bureaucratic Disentitlement After Welfare Reform: Are Fair Hearings the Cure?,
12 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 13, 50–51 (2005).
52. Id.
53. Industry Survey, supra note 42.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. ACLU & NCLC, supra note 45.
60. Id. In the FOIA response, the Department also explained that the “offset request for review
decision” field was never populated for the population analyzed. Letter from Dep’t of Educ. to
Am. C.L. Union and Nat’l Consumer L. Ctr. (2015) (on file with NCLC). The Department used a
work-around to discern offset data by decision type, acknowledging the incompleteness of this
work-around because not all hearings had a decision tag, and in some cases the tags were
ambiguous. Id.

First to Printer_Loonin_TW Edits.docx (Do Not Delete)

182

UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW

10/26/20 2:01 PM

[Vol. 11:173

hearings did occur. The Department reported a total of 45,017 garnishment
hearings during the time period from January 2012 through May 2015.61 In about
eleven percent of these cases (or 5,106), the garnishment was denied, although this
does not mean that the loan itself was cancelled. In about 5.5% of the cases (or
2,516), the Department stated that there was a favorable decision on grounds other
than hardship.62 This is apparently not a discharge decision because the Department
notes that these accounts were removed from garnishment but also that the
government will “need to reinstate in the future.”63 About fifty-two percent of the
cases resulted in an unfavorable decision for the borrower and full garnishment
continued. Only a small percentage of cases resulted in a reduction in the amount
or rate of garnishment. About twenty-five percent (or 11,288) resulted in a full, but
temporary, hardship suspension.64
B. Private Contractor Role
For years, the Department has hired private contractors for a wide range of
student aid services, including loan servicing, origination and collection.65 This
appears to be the case with collection hearings as well because the Department
outsources some key aspects of the hearing process largely to Maximus, the
Department’s current default services contractor. Founded in 1975, Maximus has a
long history of administering public benefits programs for the government, having
secured the nation’s first privatized welfare contract in 1987 in Los Angeles.66 In
2013, the Department announced a default management contract with Maximus
valued at about $143.3 million with eight one-year option periods, amounting to a

61. In the final response to the FOIA request, the Department provided data through
September 2015, adjusting the total number of hearings to 47,484. Letter from Dep’t of Educ., supra
note 60.
62. Id.
63. Industry Survey, supra note 42.
64. See infra Section II.D.
65. In addition to the contract with Maximus, for example, the Department awarded a five-year
contract in 2019 to Accenture Federal Services for a new web portal and other customer services.
Andrew Kreighbaum, Contract Awarded for New Student Borrower Website, INSIDE HIGHER ED
(Feb. 22, 2019), https://www.insidehighered.com/quicktakes/2019/02/22/contract-awarded-newstudent-borrower-website [ https://perma.cc/GD2U-XAA9 ]. The Accenture contract could be worth
as much as $577 million over eight years. Id. The Department has also hired third-party private debt
collectors for many years. The current list is available online. Collections, supra note 28.
66. Tracie McMillan, How One Company Is Making Millions Off Trump’s War on the Poor,
MOTHER JONES (Jan./Feb. 2019), https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2018/12/how-onecompany-is-making-millions-off-trumps-war-on-the-poor/ [ https://perma.cc/MS7U-72ST ].
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total estimated contract value of $848.4 million if all options are exercised.67
Maximus took over the contract from ACS/Xerox.68
A redacted version of the Maximus contract obtained through a FOIA request
indicates that the Department relies heavily on Maximus to prepare and issue draft
decisions for Department-held loans. The Department requires Maximus to
complete a draft offset hearing response no later than October 31 of the year the
pre-offset notice is mailed.69 The Department also requires Maximus to complete a
draft garnishment hearing response no later than fifty-three calendar days from the
postmark date for the hearing request.70 It is not clear who writes the final decisions.
The Department also tasks Maximus with escalating for Department review internal
correspondence of any garnishment hearing that appears to be overdue, defined as
a hearing request that has been at the collection agency for more than thirty days,
or more than seven days since the last update.71 This instruction contemplates that
Maximus could be “working” the request.
The Department’s collection agency handbook also shows how private
contractors, in this case third-party collection agencies, are involved in the hearing
process.72 The Department instructs collectors to determine the type of objection
in the hearing request, use the garnishment hardship calculator for objections due
to hardship, and send this information to Default Resolution Group for internal
review and forward to Maximus.73 The Department instructs the collection agencies
to check the system to see if the hearing request was received and processed by
Maximus.74 Private contractors are involved in the FFEL hearing system as well,
although in these cases, the FFEL regulations limit the extent to which collection
agencies can participate in the garnishment process.75

67. Press Release, Maximus, U.S. Department of Education, Office of Federal Student Aid,
Awards Maximus a Contract to Help Administer the Defaulted Student Loan Debt Program (Oct. 1,
2013),
https://investor.maximus.com/news/news-details/2013/US-Department-of-EducationOffice-of-Federal-Student-Aid-Awards-MAXIMUS-a-Contract-to-Help-Administer-the-DefaultedStudent-Loan-Debt-Program/default.aspx [ https://perma.cc/7WL3-AGDU ]. The contract number is
ED-FSA-13-C-0021. Maximus is described on the Federal Student Aid website as the loan servicer for
defaulted federal student loans over 360 days delinquent. Student Loan Delinquency and Default,
FED. STUDENT AID, https://studentaid.gov/manage-loans/default [ https://perma.cc/MA7U-S8G2 ]
( last visited Oct. 3, 2020 ).
68. The Department’s Inspector General cited the Department and ACS for a wide range of
problems and deficiencies with the debt collection management system. OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN.,
U.S. DEP’T. OF EDUC., ED-OIG/A04N004, REVIEW OF DEBT COLLECTION SYSTEM 2 (DMCS2)
IMPLEMENTATION (2015).
69. Maximus Contract, supra note 43, at 230 (amendment modification No. 0032, Jan. 6, 2016).
For a discussion of problems with Maximus at the Department and other agencies, see infra Part III.
70. Id. at 233.
71. Id.
72. PCA HANDBOOK, supra note 23, 81–118 (covering garnishment); id. at 160–64 (covering
treasury offset).
73. Id. at 100.
74. Id. at 98.
75. 34 C.F.R. § 682.410(b)(9)(i)(T) (2020); see also Loan Servicing and Collection - Frequently
Asked Questions, supra note 41, at LR-Q9, https://ifap.ed.gov/loan-servicing-and-collection-
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C. Hearing Officials
Despite extensive private contractor involvement in administering hearings, it
does not appear that Maximus or other private contractor employees serve as
hearing officers for Department-held loans. Further, it is not clear who does.
For Direct Loans, the hearing officer may be any “qualified employee” of the
Department whom the Department designates.76 The Department does not provide
a definition of “qualified employee” and does not explicitly state that the hearing
officer must be independent or neutral. The Department’s collection agency
handbook states that hearing officials are Department employees and contracted
employees that serve as impartial adjudicators.77 For FFEL hearings, the
Department prohibits collection personnel from conducting hearings and requires
that hearing officers must be independent not only of the guarantor but also of
the collector.78
The private companies responding to the industry survey reported hiring
private attorneys in most cases to conduct FFEL loan hearings.79 A large state-based
nonprofit guaranty agency said they use two independent attorneys to conduct
hearings.80 A small state-based nonprofit said they use one unaffiliated attorney.
The private servicer stated that it used an individual attorney who is an
administrative law judge.81 A midsized state agency uses hearing officers from the
state Attorney General Division of Administrative Hearings. 82
D. Barriers to Raising Substantive Claims and the “Hardship Only” Focus
Borrowers may raise a claim of hardship through the hearing process. A
hardship claim is distinct from substantive claims and defenses in that successful
hardship claims lead to temporary suspensions or reductions of the amounts seized.
Even if a borrower is successful in a hardship claim, the debt survives and the
borrower remains in default. The Department usually reviews these decisions every
six months and reinstates collection if the borrower can no longer prove hardship.83
Hardship claims are easier in most cases for the government to consider in response
to a request for hearing since these claims involve individualized financial
evaluations rather than legal analysis of eligibility criteria or other issues related to
substantive claims and defenses. Presumably, this is a key explanation for why the
Department and its contractors often steer borrowers into “simple” hardship cases,

frequently-asked-questions#LR-Q9 [ https://perma.cc/HCG8-JHXM ] (stating that private collection
employees “do not have authority to start or stop wage garnishments”).
76. 34 C.F.R. § 34.13(a)(2) (2020).
77. PCA HANDBOOK, supra note 23, at 82.
78. 34 C.F.R. § 682.410(b)(9)(I).
79. Industry Survey, supra note 42.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. LOONIN, SHAFROTH & YU, supra note 6, § 9.3.2.3.4.
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ignoring or rejecting substantive claims that challenge debt enforceability and
related claims.
The private servicer/collector in our survey, for example, stated that the
administrative law judge they employ for hearings only considers matters relating to
garnishment, which they defined as evaluating whether the loan is eligible for wage
garnishment and at what percentage.84 An evaluation of the rate of garnishment is
the same as a hardship determination because it involves considering the borrower’s
financial situation and then determining if the rate should be reduced or if
garnishment should be temporarily suspended in cases of severe hardship. Hardship
decisions are temporary decisions that are reviewed usually every six months.85 This
is a far cry from the comprehensive relief available through a successful discharge
claim where the debt is eliminated.
Student loan counselors and advocates often perpetuate this inaccurate view
of the hearing process as merely a financial evaluation. For example, one media
account described a student loan hearing as “no more than a long form detailing
your income, debt and expenses. The goal is to stop or reduce garnishment.”86 The
article quoted a student loan counselor explaining that “You hear the word ‘hearing’
and think, ‘Oh my god, I need an attorney!’ But it’s just a basic exchange
of information.”87
The experiences of one of the original Corinthian debt strikers illustrates
problems with the “hardship or nothing” hearing approach.88 This borrower was
among the first to file a borrower defense claim in 2014. As collection continued,
she filed multiple requests for a hearing to challenge wage garnishment, but she
never got a hearing.89 The letter she received from the collection agency handling
84. Industry Survey, supra note 42.
85. LOONIN, SHAFROTH & YU, supra note 6, § 9.3.2.3.4.
86. Kelsey Sheehy, Student Loan Wage Garnishment: How Default Can Gut Your Paycheck,
NERDWALLET (Aug. 24, 2020), https://www.nerdwallet.com/article/loans/student-loans/wagegarnishment-student-loan-default [ https://perma.cc/EGK5-W76W ].
87. Id.
88. The Corinthian debt strikers organized through the Debt Collective, a membership
organization offering services to empower people to dispute debts. See Michael Stratford, Corinthian
‘Debt Strike,’ INSIDE HIGHER ED (Feb. 24, 2015), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2015/02
/24/student-activists-call-%E2%80%98debt-strike%E2%80%99-against-federal-loans-they-incurredembattled [ https://perma.cc/K5GU-HFFU ] (sharing that Debt Collective stated that it was protesting
the Department of Education’s support for Corinthian’s “predatory empire” that “pushed hundreds of
thousands into a debt trap”). See generally DEBT COLLECTIVE, https://debtcollective.org/
[ https://perma.cc/LE2N-FUAM ] ( last visited Oct. 3, 2020 ).
89. The Debt Collective detailed the experiences of this borrower, Jessica Madison, in a March
31, 2019 letter to the House Education and Labor Committee. Letter from Thomas Gokey, Co-Founder
and Organizer, Debt Collective, and Ann Larson, Co-Founder and Dir., Debt Collective, to Claire Viall
and Kathy Valle, Educ. & Lab. Comm., U.S. House of Reps. (Mar. 31, 2019) [hereinafter 2019 Debt
Collective Letter] (on file with author). For further descriptions of Ms. Madison’s fight for borrower
defense relief, see Danielle Douglas-Gabriel, Trump Changes Higher Ed with Rollback of Obama-Era
Consumer Protections, WASH. POST (July 9, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/education/
trump-changes-higher-ed-with-rollback-of-obama-era-consumer-protections/2017/07/09/89acd78a59e3-11e7-9b7d-14576dc0f39d_story.html [ https://perma.cc/9U4T-H9M8 ]; Vimal Patel, Look Who’s
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the account showed that the agency either did not read or understand the request
because they asserted she was requesting a hardship reduction or suspension when,
in fact, she raised a substantive defense of unenforceability.90 By January 2017, the
Department approved the borrower defense application, but shockingly, the
garnishments continued.91 The garnishment only stopped months later when a
journalist contacted the Department and the collection agency about this specific
case. Two days later, the garnishment stopped.92
In a 2012 decision, a borrower requested a hearing, but the Department
mistakenly scheduled the hearing for a borrower with a different name.93 Because
the borrower with the last name of Topping could not provide identification for a
borrower named “Toppina,” he was prohibited from participating in the hearing.94
The borrower subsequently contacted his congresswoman and together they
requested an explanation from the Department.95 The borrower then received a
garnishment hearing decision stating that he did not have a financial hardship.96
This decision ignored that he was raising a substantive defense, not hardship.
Eventually the Department official admitted the hearing was held for the wrong
reason and withdrew the garnishment order.97
This practice of steering borrowers into hardship is likely related at least in
part to confusion over whether the hearing officials should or can make decisions
on substantive defenses, including requests for loan discharges. On one hand, the
Department has stated that hearing officials are responsible for evaluating discharge
and other loan enforceability claims. For example, in 2013, the Department stated
specifically that if a borrower raises enforceability in a hearing, it is clear that the
hearing official must determine whether the debt in question is enforceable and if
so, in what amount.98 The Department described this as more than a
bookkeeping test.99
The request for hearing forms clearly include boxes to check for substantive
defenses including claims related to statutory discharges such as closed school and
disability.100 In response to litigation in 2018, the Department even changed the

Talking About Cancelling Debt: How a Fringe Idea Went Mainstream, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Jan. 23,
2020, at A8.
90. 2019 Debt Collective Letter, supra note 89.
91. Id.
92. Id. This borrower, Jessica Madison, eventually suffered serious health issues and died in
October 2019. Patel, supra note 89.
93. Topping v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., No. 2:09-CV-396-FTM-29, 2012 WL 397809
(M.D. Fla. Feb. 8, 2012), aff’d, 510 F. App’x 816 (11th Cir. 2013).
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Student Assistance General Provisions, 78 Fed. Reg. 65768, 65782 (Nov. 1, 2013) (to be
codified at 34 C.F.R. pts. 668, 674, 682, 685).
99. Id.
100. See supra note 38.
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offset notice and request for hearing forms to include a specific reference to
borrower defenses.101 The prior forms simply provided a space for borrowers to
check and explain an assertion that the loan was not enforceable.102 In contrast, the
revised form provides a separate space for a borrower to check and explain a
defense to repayment of a debt, also known as a borrower defense, which is an
assertion that the loan is void or unenforceable because of school misconduct.103
On the other hand, the Department has stated that hearing officials are not
qualified to evaluate at least some substantive claims, including critical claims about
loan enforceability. During litigation in 2017, a Department official serving as the
Supervisory Program and Management Analyst in the Department’s Hearings and
Interagency Appeals Branch (a subpart of Federal Student Aid, or FSA), testified
that her department “does not, nor does it possess the necessary qualifications or
authority to, review the merits of borrower defense claims submitted
by borrowers.”104
Similarly, one of the companies in the industry survey acknowledged that it
handles substantive discharge defenses by terminating the garnishment process and
passing the application to the regular “discharge regulatory process.”105 The agency
does not expect hearing officers to evaluate these substantive claims
and defenses.106
The other companies responding to the industry survey provided conflicting
information about handling substantive defenses and discharges.107 Although
difficult to believe, one stated that a borrower has never raised a discharge issue on
a hearing form.108 Another said that if a borrower raises discharge, the agency
ombudsman reviews and determines eligibility, and if eligibility is found, the
discharge is processed.109 This is distinct from the hearing process. The large
nonprofit agency said that if the borrower has not previously raised the objection,
the borrower is provided an application (if applicable) to provide other supporting
documentation to determine enforceability.110 The documentation is reviewed prior
101. Defendant’s Status Report at 2, Williams v. DeVos, No. CV 16-11949-LTS, 2019
WL7592345 (D. Mass. Aug. 8, 2019), ECF No. 101.
102. See Letter from John S. Brooks, Acting Dir., Default Div., Fed. Student Aid, U.S. Dep’t of
Educ., to Treasury Offset Coordinator ( June 27, 2016), https://library.nclc.org/sites/default/files/
TOP-pkg.pdf [ https://perma.cc/Z7UR-YLFF ] (enclosing an “Addendum to the Agreement Pursuant
to Section 428(b) of the Higher Education Act of 1965, as amended, with a State or Private Non-profit
Institution or Organization for Coverage of Its Student Loan Insurance Program under the Interest
Benefits Provision of Section 428(a) of the Act,” including a “Request for Review” form as
Attachment E).
103. Defendant’s Status Report, supra note 101, at Exhibit D.
104. Declaration of Myra Tyler at 8, Dieffenbacher v. DeVos, No. 17-cv-00342 (C.D. Cal. May
22, 2017), ECF No. 27-1.
105. Industry Survey, supra note 42.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
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to scheduling a hearing.111 If the borrower’s defense is determined to be valid,
garnishment activity is stopped and no hearing is scheduled.112 If the documentation
does not support the borrower’s claim, a hearing is scheduled.
E. The Overall Broken Hearing Experience
The student loan collection hearing system is broken in several ways. One
major problem is the Department’s failure to consider evidence borrowers submit.
It does not appear to matter if the borrower checks the box for discharge or
provides extensive supporting documentation. The borrower may send extensive
evidence to back up the defense only to find in many cases that the government
does not bother to read the enclosed evidence or claims not to have received it. In
other cases, the government pretends that it held a hearing and issues a decision
that has nothing to do with the defense raised. Another barrier is the Department’s
ignoring requests for oral hearings and simply issuing written decisions.
In one case, for example, a borrower requested a hearing in response to a
garnishment notice.113 She was eventually able to get a hearing with a judge who
told her that the purpose of the hearing was just to inform her of the wage
garnishment amount and the date it would start.114 The agency did not have copies
of the original documents to prove the existence of the debt and default.115 The
judge said he would abstain from making a decision and would give the agency time
to figure out what had happened. Instead, about a month later, the judge rendered
decision in favor of garnishment without reconvening the hearing.116
In another case, a for-profit school borrower objected to garnishment by
asserting a borrower defense on the grounds of school fraud and other legal
violations, supported by hundreds of pages of exhibits and legal argument.117
Despite requesting an in-person hearing, she received a “hearing decision” a
few weeks later, which simply stated,
Your client objected that she believe [sic] that her loans are not an
enforceable debts [sic]. . . . ECMC explained to you and your client why
these loans were enforceable and they had addressed your concerns and
enclosed copy of the borrower’s promissory notes. Because ECMC holds
the promissory note(s) and other and other [sic] records supporting the
existence of this debt, the borrower has the burden to prove that the debt
is not owed. . . . [T]he Department finds that the borrower [sic] student

111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Mark Kantrowitz, The Horrors of Defaulting on Education Debt, FASTWEB (May 28, 2015),
https://www.fastweb.com/financial-aid/articles/the-horrors-of-defaulting-on-education-debt [ https://
perma.cc/2RL9-WLBR ].
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Complaint, Dieffenbacher v. DeVos, No. 17-cv-00342 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 23, 2017).
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loan debt is still legally enforceable; therefore the borrower objection
is denied.118
The Department halted garnishment only after the borrower filed a federal
lawsuit and sought a temporary restraining order.119 After two years of litigation, the
Department managed to evade judgment on the sufficiency of its process and the
merits of the borrower defense when the borrower filed for personal bankruptcy.120
Unprompted, the Department offered to discharge her loans under the “undue
hardship” provision.121
In practice, the more information a borrower provides to support substantive
claims and defenses, the more likely it is that the loan holder will not know what to
do with the information or will lose it. For example, in one recent case with a
borrower represented by Project on Predatory Student Lending attorneys in Boston,
a client and former predatory school student raised unenforceability as a defense to
both garnishment and offset. A nameless hearing official (or officials) issued a
decision on garnishment and offset within a few weeks of each other. In both cases,
the borrower and her attorneys sent a cover letter requesting a hearing, a request
for hearing form signed by the client, and a copy of the borrower defense
application with extensive evidence. Even though the client separately submitted a
borrower defense application to the Department, the nameless hearing official
“evaluating” the garnishment request for hearing stated that the agency had not
received notification that this application had been submitted. Contrary to prior
Department instructions, the official also stated that all borrower defense
applications must be submitted in paper format. In contrast, the nameless hearing
official signing the offset decision stated that the agency had received the borrower
defense application and sent it to the Department for processing and in the
meantime, the official denied the request to stop offset because the borrower did
not object in a timely fashion. The borrower sent the same exact information in
both cases and received completely contradictory results.
Despite the breakdown of this system, the Department continues to present
administrative hearings as a way for borrowers to access relief. For example, in
February 2020, the Department announced a new forgery discharge form and
process intended to help borrowers raise defenses to repayment by disputing the
authenticity of their signatures on loan agreements.122 The Department explained
that borrowers have the right to present this evidence in court or in an
administrative proceeding seeking to enforce the debt, such garnishment or
118.
119.

Id.
For more on the Dieffenbacher v. DeVos case, see Dieffenbacher v. DeVos, PROJECT ON
PREDATORY STUDENT LENDING, https://predatorystudentlending.org/cases/dieffenbacher-v-devos/
[ https://perma.cc/WJ94-GYWL ] ( last visited Oct. 3, 2020 ).
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Letter from Fed. Student Aid, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., New Form for Forgery Loan Discharge
Process for ED-Held Loans (Feb. 12, 2020), https://ifap.ed.gov/electronic-announcements/021220
form4forgeryloandischargeprocess4edheldloans [ https://perma.cc/W3HD-ZZXD ].
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Treasury offset.123 Presumably this is a reference to the broken student loan
collection hearing process.
In other examples, some lawmakers and advocates are calling for a formal
appeals process when the Department improperly denies rights such as public
service loan forgiveness.124 Here too, calling for a broken process as a solution to
remedy improper and inaccurate denials of borrower rights is highly problematic
and in any case not going to work. It is a recipe for failure if, as described above,
borrowers attempt to utilize the system and find out that it is largely illusory.
III. THE RISKS OF PRIVATE OUTSOURCING AND THE INHERENTLY
GOVERNMENTAL FUNCTION DOCTRINE
Agency capture and revolving door problems exist in nearly every government
agency, but they can be particularly acute in the world of federal student loans given
the complexity of the programs and the close working relationship between the
Department and its contractors.125 In a revealing 2013 email exchange on a debt
collection industry web forum, one participant discussing how to enter the
government student loan debt collection market stated that “[g]etting student loans
on contingency takes political connections, period.”126 Another added, “You have to
be a huge player in the game and have some type of connection to even get a piece
of the pie from government backed loans.”127
It should not be a surprise that the same well-connected companies keep
winning government contract competitions. These entrenched companies also tend
to exploit every possible appeal and protest avenue if their business is threatened,
delaying and in some cases halting government efforts to change or hire
new contractors.128

123. Id.
124. See, e.g., Stacy Cowley, The Student Loan Appeal Process the Government Doesn’t Tell You
About, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 17, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/17/business/federalstudent-loan-appeals.html [ https://perma.cc/4WKQ-9FE9 ].
125. See generally Martha Graybow, “Revolving Door” Eyed in Student Loan Scandal,
BOSTON.COM (Apr. 19, 2007), http://archive.boston.com/news/education/higher/articles/2007/04/
19/revolving_door_eyed_in_student_loan_scandal/?rss_id=Boston.com+%252F+News [ https://
perma.cc/467Q-9D4U ]; Deanne Loonin & Julie Morgan, Federal Student Aid: Can We Solve a Problem
We Do Not Understand?, 2018 Utah L. Rev. 897, 906–07 (2018). In their article, Loonin and Morgan
explain that “agency capture” refers to the phenomenon of government agencies becoming susceptible
to the influence and control of the corporate entities they are meant to regulate. The “revolving door”
refers to the pattern of employees of regulated entities moving back and forth between public and private
sector employment.
126. AmeripayC, Comment to Looking to Move into Student Loan Collections, INSIDE ARM
(Aug. 30, 2013, 8:36 AM), http://www.insidearm.com/forum/topic/looking-to-move-into-studentloan-collections/#post-130384 [ https://perma.cc/FKD7-FGGA ].
127. Id.
128. Colleen Campbell, The Long Path to a New Student Loan Repayment System, CTR. FOR
AM. PROGRESS (Sept. 10, 2019, 5:00 AM), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/educationpostsecondary/news/2019/09/10/474254/long-path-new-student-loan-repayment-system/ [ https://
perma.cc/3Q7X-MP4W ].
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In the hearing area, the Department appears to rely heavily on Maximus for
hearing administration and related tasks.129 This is a company that has a long track
record of problems and sanctions related to federal and state contracts, mostly in
the welfare and health benefits fields.130 Beneficiary complaints are ubiquitous.131
In a December 2019 report, the Government Contractor Accountability Project
described a litany of serious problems with Maximus’s administration of Medicaid
programs across the country.132 Among other problems at the Department of
Education, Maximus was the debt management contractor in 2019 during a
prolonged period of serious call center communication breakdowns.133
Though Maximus generally operates under the public radar, as of September
2017 it had nearly $2.5 billion in annual revenue and 20,400 employees around the
world.134 As one expert wrote, the company is so enmeshed in government public
benefits programs that “they are almost becoming government.”135
The inherently governmental function doctrine was developed to reduce or
eliminate the risks of hiring private actors, such as Maximus, to administer and
control key government functions.136 As courts have noted, “the basic concept of
democratic rule . . . is compromised when public powers are abandoned to those
who are neither elected by the people, appointed by a public official or entity, nor
employed by the government.”137 Private corporations exist primarily to maximize
profits. When a corporation makes eligibility and related decisions for government
programs, it is very difficult to safeguard against self-interest or conflicts of interest
on the part of the corporation.138 These are serious concerns given the long history

129. See supra Section II.B.
130. McMillan, supra note 66.
131. Dru Stevenson, Privatization of Welfare Services: Delegation by Contract, 45
ARIZ. L. REV. 83, 108 (2003).
132. GOV’T CONTRACTOR ACCOUNTABILITY PROJECT, MAXIMUM HARM: MAXIMUS’S
MEDICAID MANAGEMENT FAILURES (2019), https://www.maximusaccountability.org/system/files/
2019.11.07_maximumharmreport.pdf [ https://perma.cc/X8M5-6F8F ]; see also Becky Z. Dernbach,
This Is What Happens When You Let a For-Profit Company Run Public Benefits, MOTHER JONES
(Dec. 16, 2019), https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2019/12/this-is-what-happens-when-youlet-a-for-profit-company-run-public-benefits/ [ https://perma.cc/9B9Y-8DMD ]; John Lasker, Special
Report - Profitus Maximus, PULSE (Mar. 14, 2013), https://www.chattanoogapulse.com/features/
profitus-maximus/ [https://perma.cc/5C2N-VC4U]; Jonas Persson & Mary Bottari, Privatization
Fail: The Troubled History of Maximus Inc., PR WATCH (Oct. 24, 2014, 9:36 AM), https://
www.prwatch.org/news/2014/10/12638/privatization-fail-troubled-history-maximus-inc [ https://
perma.cc/4E4E-SS8N ].
133. Danielle Douglas-Gabriel, Staffing Shortage at Education Department’s Loan Default Unit
Frustrates Struggling Borrowers, WASH. POST (Mar. 21, 2019, 11:01 AM),
https://www.washington
post.com/education/2019/03/21/staffing-shortage-education-departments-loan-default-units-frustratesstruggling-borrowers/ [ https://perma.cc/N8SG-DE37 ].
134. McMillan, supra note 66.
135. Id.
136. See generally Thomas J. Laubacher, Simplifying Inherently Governmental Functions: Creating a
Principled Approach from Its Ad Hoc Beginnings, 46 PUB. CONT. L.J. 791 (2017).
137. Tex. Boll Weevil Eradication Found. v. Lewellen, 952 S.W.2d 454, 469 (Tex. 1997).
138. Stevenson, supra note 131, at 103–04.
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in the United States of government partnerships with the private sector where the
government enabled or ignored private sector practices that promoted
discrimination and other illegal activities.139
All three branches of the government have refined the definition of inherently
governmental functions over time, including in the 1998 Federal Activities
Inventory Reform Act (FAIR Act).140 In 2011, the Obama administration
established two tests for identifying these functions.141 The first examines the nature
of the function.142 Under this test, functions that involve the exercise of sovereign
powers are inherently governmental.143 The policy letter describing these tests listed
the functions meeting the definition, including representing the United States in an
intergovernmental forum or body.144 The second test examines the exercise of
discretion in the function: “‘[I]f the exercise of . . . discretion commits the
government to a course of action where two or more alternative courses of action
exist,’ it is inherently governmental unless the decision-making is guided by specific
ranges of acceptable discretion and is subject to meaningful oversight or final
approval by agency officials.”145 The letter does not establish what should be done
if an agency violates the requirement not to contract out these functions.146
Acting as a decision maker in a student loan collection hearing should meet
one or both of these tests. A hearing officer is exercising discretion that commits
the government not only to reductions in amounts collected but also binds the
government to comprehensive relief options such as discharges. In general, deciding
cases involves discretion when weighing evidence and applying the law. Hearing
officials are deciding, among other issues, how government resources should be
utilized. Although not a full judicial trial, these hearings should provide borrowers
with substantial due process rights related to presentations of evidence, processes
to request documents, standards for allowable claims and defenses, and burdens of
proof.147
There is substantial precedent that judicial and quasi-judicial functions such as
administrative hearings fit within the inherently governmental function category.

139. See generally KEEANGA-YAMAHTTA TAYLOR, RACE FOR PROFIT: HOW BANKS AND THE
REAL ESTATE INDUSTRY UNDERMINED BLACK HOMEOWNERSHIP (2019).
140. Federal Activities Inventory Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-270, § 5(2)(A), 112
Stat. 2382, 2384 (codified at 31 U.S.C. § 501).
141. Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP) Policy Letter 11-01, Performance of
Inherently Governmental and Critical Functions, 76 Fed. Reg. 56,227 (Sept. 12, 2011).
142. Laubacher, supra note 136, at 811.
143. Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP) Policy Letter 11-01, 76 Fed. Reg. at 56, 227.
144. Id.
145. Laubacher, supra note 136, at 811 (quoting Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP)
Policy Letter 11-01, 76 Fed. Reg. at 56,237).
146. Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP) Policy Letter 11-01, 76 Fed. Reg. at 56, 240
(explaining that agencies shall develop and maintain internal procedures to address the requirements of
this guidance, and those procedures shall be reviewed by agency management no less than every
two years).
147. See supra Part IV.
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For example, in a 2000 ruling, a court drew a distinction between delegations of
rulemaking authority to the private sector, which affect a general class, and
delegations of adjudicative power, which determine the rights of an individual.148
The former is more likely to survive judicial scrutiny when, for example, a legislature
gives authority to voters to make rules through public referendums.149 In contrast,
according to the court, transferring judicial type decision-making “is what the Due
Process Clause prohibits.”150
Preliminary hearing activities, such as reviewing requests for hearings and
transferring requests within the agency, are arguably also inherently governmental
functions. In practice, nearly every aspect of the hearing process requires the type
of discretion that should not be left to the private sector. Drafting a garnishment
hearing response, for example, requires discretion regarding which claims to
consider and the substance of the response. This is similar to the arguments for
classifying administration of FOIA requests as inherently governmental
functions.151 The steps involved in both areas are not easily divided into roles that
require judgment and discretion and those that do not. The best course of action to
ensure integrity of the process is to err on the side of prohibiting private
company involvement.
Whether these preliminary hearing functions are considered inherently
governmental may depend on the scope of discretion and the level of oversight.
Courts considering how to draw these lines generally ask if the private delegate’s
actions are subject to meaningful review by a government agency.152 It is not clear
how much review would be sufficient to allow private outsourcing, especially since
government oversight of private contractors, including at the Department, has
historically been weak.153 Further, if the purpose of the inherently governmental
function doctrine is to require that these functions be completed by federal
employees, the mere possibility of oversight does not satisfy that purpose.154 Among
other issues, this also leads to the question of why the government should outsource
key functions if doing so tends to exacerbate existing problems and creates a need
for even more oversight.155 A GAO associate director testified in 1998 that when
the governmental role in the delivery of services is reduced through privatization,

148. Stevenson, supra note 131, at 99 (discussing Club Misty, Inc. v. Laski, 208 F.3d 615 (7th
Cir. 2000)).
149. Id.
150. Club Misty, Inc., 208 F.3d at 622.
151. Tiffany A. Stedman, Outsourcing Openness: Problems with the Private Processing of Freedom
of Information Act Requests, 35 PUB. CONT. L.J. 133, 148–49 (2005).
152. See, e.g., Tex. Boll Weevil Eradication Found. v. Lewellen, 952 S.W.2d 454 (Tex. 1997)
(reviewing nondelegation doctrine and sets out an eight-part test).
153. See Laubacher, supra note 136, at 818 (arguing that despite discussion of problems with lack
of oversight of federal procurements, improvements have not happened).
154. Stedman, supra note 151, at 149.
155. Id. at 152.
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the need for aggressive monitoring and oversight grows.156 Further, oversight is
necessary to evaluate compliance with the terms of the privatization agreement and
in delivering the goods and services.157
Despite the persuasive authority that hearing administrations should be
inherently government functions, it does not appear that the Department has
formally made this classification. The FAIR Act required agencies to create a list of
activities performed by the agency that are not inherently governmental and submit
that list to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and to the public.158 As
of early 2020, the latest FAIR inventory on the Department’s website was from
2017.159 This outdated inventory describes a general “collection” category classified
as closely associated with inherently governmental functions.160 The “closely
associated” category is derived from the Obama administration 2011 policy memo
which differentiated among functions closely associated with inherently
governmental function (thus outsourceable in specific situations) and critical
functions that must be performed by government employees.161
In response to a request for clarification, the designated Department official
stated that the inventory is outdated because the Department had not yet received
approval from the Office of Management and Budget to post the 2018 FAIR Act
report.162 In response to the question of whether the Department classifies jobs
related to collection hearings as inherently governmental functions, the official said
that “it is difficult to answer your question accurately” because “there doesn’t
appear to be any categories to determine which jobs are related to administrative
collection hearings.”163

156. Id. (citing Competition for Commercial Activities in the Federal Government: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Oversight of Gov’t Mgmt. Restructuring & the Dist. of Columbia, 105th Cong. (1998)
(statement of J. Christopher Mihm, Acting Associate Director, Federal Management Workforce Issues,
U.S. General Accounting Office)).
157. Id.
158. Federal Activities Inventory Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-270, § 2(a)-(c)(1), 112
Stat. 2382 (codified at 31 U.S.C. § 501).
159. U.S. Dep’t of Education FAIR Act Inventory, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., https://www2.ed.gov/
about/offices/list/ocfo/fair-act-inventory/index.html [ https://perma.cc/Q5ET-Q6WU ] ( last visited
Oct. 3, 2020 ).
160. Id.
161. Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP) Policy Letter 11-01, 76 Fed. Reg. at 56,238
(stating that agencies subject to the FAIR Act must give special consideration to using federal employees
to perform functions closely associated with inherently governmental functions).
162. E-mail from Vito Pietanza, Contracts Acquisition Innovation Advocate, U.S. Dep’t of
Educ., to the author ( Jan. 21, 2020) (on file with author). Mr. Pietanza is listed on the Department’s
FAIR Act Inventory website as the contact for questions. See U.S. Department of Education FAIR Act
Inventory, supra note 159.
163. E-mail from Vito Pietanza, supra note 162.
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IV. LACK OF GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY AND BORROWER DUE PROCESS
RIGHTS
The risks arising from privatization should not obscure the dismal public
record of oversight in the federal student aid program. There is a long and
unfortunate history of bureaucratic failures at the Department of Education.164 The
Department too often abdicates its duty to borrowers in order to cut costs or serve
other constituencies, including private companies that lobby heavily for access and
profitable contracts.165 These problems stem from the conflict of interest inherent
in the current structure of federal aid where the government is both the lender,
school participation gatekeeper, and collector.166 This is fueled by corruption,
including a revolving door of industry interests in the government and other
policymaking circles.167
These concerns can be addressed in part through both expanded public and
private oversight and enforcement of borrower rights, but a key problem is the lack
of hearing-specific oversight requirements. For FFEL loans, the agreements
guaranty agencies must sign to participate in the treasury offset program require the
agencies to submit a final offset evaluation report to the Department and provide
the Department with a sample of responses to borrower objections to offset for
one percent of the cases.168 In addition, guaranty agencies are supposed to provide
the Department with the nature, total number, and disposition of borrower
objections.169 It is not clear if this is done and if so, whether the information is
public, but it should be.
Historically lax federal government oversight underscores the importance of
state and private enforcement actions. Constitutional due process cases should be a
centerpiece of these enforcement actions, building on the fair hearing rights the
Supreme Court set out in Goldberg v. Kelly and progeny.
The Supreme Court held in Goldberg v. Kelly that due process protections
applied to welfare benefits because those benefits were a matter of statutory
entitlement and that hearings must occur before termination of benefits.170 The
164. See, e.g., Cory Turner, Federal Watchdog Issues Scathing Report on Ed Department’s Handling
of Student Loans, NPR (Feb. 14, 2019, 11:20 AM), https://www.npr.org/2019/02/14/
694477547/federal-watchdog-issues-scathing-report-on-ed-departments-handling-of-student-lo [ https://
perma.cc/5TXT-T4A2 ].
165. Id.
166. Loonin & Morgan, supra note 125, at 911.
167. JULIE MARGETTA MORGAN, ROOSEVELT INST., WHO PAYS? HOW INDUSTRY INSIDERS
RIG THE STUDENT LOAN SYSTEM—AND HOW TO STOP IT ( 2018), https://rooseveltinstitute.org/
wp-content/uploads/2020/07/RI-Who-Pays-Insiders-Rig-Student-Loan-System-201806.pdf [ https://
perma.cc/37RQ-NBXD ].
168. Letter from John S. Brooks, supra note 102, at app. I § 7.4. Earlier versions of these
agreements are available online. Guaranty Agency, MYEDDEBT.ED.GOV, https://myeddebt.ed.gov/
partner/partnerGASupportTOPMenu.action [ https://perma.cc/K92N-WJXC ] ( last visited
Oct. 3, 2020 ).
169. Id.
170. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 261 (1970).
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Court went on to spell out essential features for hearings, including provision of
timely and adequate notice, a chance to argue the case orally, and full notice of
decisions in writing.171 The influence of this decision carried beyond welfare to
other government benefits programs.172 Six years after Goldberg, the Supreme Court
set out a balancing test in Mathews v. Eldrige to determine what type of process is
due in these cases.173
Despite the strong protections set out in Goldberg and subsequent cases,
student loan borrowers have been mostly unsuccessful in challenging student loan
collection hearings on constitutional due process grounds.174 Courts have held that
borrowers just need an opportunity to be heard before a neutral decision maker but
have not expressed much about how meaningful that opportunity should be.175 In
one case, the court stated that the individual’s need for the portion of his wages
subject to garnishment did not approach the public interest at stake in Goldberg
v. Kelly.176
Courts have also upheld the Department’s process of conducting garnishment
hearings mostly in writing rather than orally or in person, expressing sympathy with
the pressure of dealing with the large volume of annual actions.177 Even cases
challenging the neutrality of the arbiter have sided with the government.178 In at
least a few cases, the Department has chosen to change practices, such as notice
provisions, going forward even though the borrower’s challenge on due process
grounds failed.179
Nonetheless, beyond due process claims, borrowers may bring other claims
against state actors that are not available against private entities. This includes

171. Id. at 267–69.
172. Jason Parkin, Adaptable Due Process, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1309, 1325 (2012).
173. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). The test includes three factors: First, the
private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation
of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substantive
procedural safeguards; and third, the government’s interest, including the function involved and the
fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would
entail. Id.
174. LOONIN, SHAFROTH & YU, supra note 6, § 14.2.6.
175. Nelson v. Diversified Collection Servs., Inc., 961 F. Supp. 863, 870 (1997).
176. Id.
177. Pageus v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., No. 1:07-cv-03167-JOF, 2010 WL 731590, at *5–6
(N.D. Ga. Feb. 25, 2010).
178. Kelly v. Aman Collection Servs., No. 03-6091, 2007 WL 909547, at *11 (D. Minn. Mar. 23,
2007) (finding that nothing precluded Department of Education from designating an employee as
hearing official).
179. LOONIN, SHAFROTH & YU, supra note 6, § 14.4.6.2. Borrowers may also be successful in
cases where the Department fails to comply with the requirements for properly assigning debts to the
Department of Treasury for collection. See, e.g., Ibrahim v. United States, 112 Fed. Cl. 333 (2013)
(denying government’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s claim that tax offset was illegal and holding that
Department of Education misapplied section 3720A when it used plaintiff’s refund to satisfy debt of
another); Kipple v. United States, 102 Fed. Cl. 773 (2012) (denying government’s motion for summary
judgment because questions remained about whether the school properly assigned student loan note to
the Department of Education and whether the Department followed DCIA offset procedures).
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§ 1983, which provides the statutory vehicle for remedying constitutional and
federal statutory violations committed by state actors.180 The government should
also be liable for discriminatory practices in administration of the federal student
loan program under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act and other antidiscrimination
laws.181
V. REFORMING THE EXISTING COLLECTION HEARING SYSTEM
A. Procedural Justice and Transparency
The goal of reforming the existing student loan collection hearing process is
to make procedural justice a reality for student loan borrowers. As professor and
sociologist Rebecca Sandefur writes, “When people perceive that the decision
process that led to an outcome was fair, incorporated their participation, treated
them with respect, and was managed by an impartial adjudicator, they experience
procedural justice.”182
The first step to achieving procedural fairness is to require transparency about
hearing volume, outcomes, and borrower experiences. A key argument for the utility
of administrative hearings is to shine a light on patterns of administrative error.183
This can only occur if borrowers know about the hearings and are able to access
them and if the government and contractors provide key outcome information
and data.
The FOIA process is one way to get this information, but it too is broken.184
There are significant drawbacks to the current FOIA process, including that it puts
the burden on the requester to know what documents or records the government
has produced or possesses. It is time-consuming and can be expensive.185 Further,
its exemptions—particularly those for trade secrets and law enforcement—make it
difficult to retrieve information that pertains to student loan servicing, debt
collection, and other loan-related activities.186
180. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
181 JEREMIAH BATTLE, JR., CREDIT DISCRIMINATION § 2.2.5.6 (Nat’l Consumer L. Center
ed., 7th ed. 2018). Senator Elizabeth Warren presented a plan to address racial disparities and predatory
practices in the higher education system as part of her presidential campaign. The plan notes that the
Department of Education is sitting on evidence of massive racial disparities in administration of the
student loan program. Elizabeth Warren, My Plan to Cancel Student Loan Debt on Day One of My
Presidency, WARREN DEMOCRATS, https://elizabethwarren.com/plans/student-loan-debt-day-one
[ https://perma.cc/C7TQ-HKG3 ] ( last visited Oct. 3, 2020 ). Private contractors should also be liable
for violations of anti-discrimination laws.
182. Rebecca L. Sandefur & Thomas M. Clarke, Designing the Competition: A Future of Roles
Beyond Lawyers? The Case of the USA, 67 HASTINGS L.J. 1467, 1478 (2016).
183. Lens, supra note 51, at 35.
184. See generally Loonin & Morgan, supra note 125, at 910–17.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 913; see also N.Y. Legal Assistance Grp., Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., No. 15 Civ. 3818
(LGS), 2017 WL 2973976, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. July 12, 2017) (finding that the collection agency handbook
and certain disability discharge guidelines did not qualify as law enforcement documents under
Exemption 7(E)).
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There is a need to reform the FOIA process to shine the light on government
activities and on private contractor practices as well. Even the government often
faces roadblocks trying to access information about contractors’ proprietary
systems, which are owned and maintained by the companies.187 When the
Department requires information, it must put together a detailed request and, in
some cases, pay for the extra work the contractor must perform.188 Department
resources to pursue this information have been limited.189
In addition to greater transparency about government practices, the
government must also be more transparent with borrowers by providing
information about relief programs. The government and its contractors too often
create barriers to program usage by failing to inform borrowers about relief
programs and about how to access them.190 In other cases, the government has
created eligibility standards that are nearly impossible for borrowers to meet.191
Piven and Cloward’s description of public welfare systems in the ‘60s rings
disturbingly true today:
[P]ublic welfare systems try to keep their budgets down and their rolls low
by failing to inform people of the rights available to them; by intimidating
and shaming them to the degree that they are reluctant either to apply or
to press claims, and by arbitrarily denying benefits to those who
are eligible.192
187. Campbell, supra note 128.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. See Loonin & Morgan, supra note 125, at 904–05; Danielle Douglas-Gabriel, GAO Study
Says Confusing Terms of a Temporary Program for Student Loan Forgiveness Resulted in High Denial Rate,
WASH. POST (Sept. 5, 2019, 11:45 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/education/2019/09/05/
gao-study-says-confusing-terms-temporary-program-student-loan-forgiveness-resulted-high-denialrate/ [ https://perma.cc/8LJE-6ZJS ]; Danielle Douglas-Gabriel, Government Gets Tough on Student
Loan Servicers, But Will It Be Effective?, WASH. POST (July 20, 2016, 2:37 PM), https://www.washington
post.com/news/grade-point/wp/2016/07/20/government-gets-tough-on-student-loan-servicers-butwill-it-be-effective/ [ https://perma.cc/BYW4-57VK ]. The Department may even build in low
utilization rates in estimating program costs. For example, in a 2015 article, Department officials
estimated the cost of loan discharges at the predatory school chain Corinthian based on a low six
percent discharge program usage rate. Michael Stratford, Corinthian Closes for Good, INSIDE HIGHER
ED (Apr. 27, 2015), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2015/04/27/corinthian-ends-operationsremaining-campuses-affecting-16000-students [ https://perma.cc/ANN6-96SG ].
191. See, e.g., Press Release, The Project on Predatory Student Lending, Student Advocates
Challenge DeVos’s Borrower Defense Rule (Feb. 19, 2020), https://predatorystudentlending.org/
news/press-releases/student-advocates-challenge-devos-borrower-defense-rule-press-release/ [ https://
perma.cc/CM7S-4BZ8 ]. Borrowers that do learn about relief options can in some cases
administratively appeal denials of their applications. This is distinct from the student loan collection
hearing process discussed in this Article. Only borrowers facing the extraordinarily powerful array of
government collection powers can use the student loan collection hearing process as a way to raise
substantive claims and defenses and seek comprehensive relief. These collection hearings are supposed
to be more like judicial proceedings with a number of mandatory due process requirements. The
reconsideration right after discharge denials, in contrast, is generally a perfunctory written review. If
denied at this reconsideration stage, borrowers are entitled to seek formal review in federal court.
192. Frances Fox Piven & Richard Cloward, The Weight of the Poor: A Strategy to End Poverty,
NATION (Mar. 8, 2010), https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/weight-poor-strategy-end-
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Challenging agency administrative processes not only expands access to
individual relief but also may bolster the movement for systemic change discussed
in Part VII.193
B. Eliminating the Private Contractor Role and Holding Government Accountable
One way to eliminate the risks of privatization is to classify all aspects of the
hearing process as inherently governmental, eliminating the private contractor role
altogether.194 The Department should do so formally through the FAIR process. If
the Department fails to do so, Congress must.195 In the past Congress has declared
certain functions inherently governmental (or not) and removed funding from
various programs that it felt did not accurately address inherently
governmental functions.196
Although it is preferable for government employees to administer all aspects
of the hearing process, it might be possible for some of these functions to be
performed privately if there were rigorous government oversight. This is a
tremendous challenge given the Department’s track record.197
If private contractors remain in some capacity, the government must make the
performance metrics public and ensure that the contracts compensate contractors
for doing the right thing and complying with borrower rights provisions. The
government should also include third-party beneficiary rights so that borrowers
could force compliance with the terms of the contracts.198
Private contractors in these situations must also be liable for abuses and legal
violations that occur in their hearing-related capacities. In theory, private
contractors should be liable for claims that government agencies can at times evade
due to sovereign immunity. However, private contractors often attempt to avoid
liability by arguing that they have derivative immunity. This is a legal area in some
flux as the Supreme Court in recent years has hinted at possible immunity for
contractors.199 Courts and Congress must act to halt this growing movement toward
private sector immunity and evasion of liability.
In addition to common law claims and rigorous government oversight, public
enforcement agencies and individuals bringing private claims should consider other
claims that are available against private entities that are not available against the

poverty/ [ https://perma.cc/3VCM-PWRL ] (providing a new introduction to the May 2, 1966 Nation
article with the same title).
193. Id. (describing a view that a massive drive to recruit eligible individuals onto public
assistance rolls would precipitate a financial and political crisis, forcing a federal solution to poverty).
194. See supra Part IV.
195. Laubacher, supra note 136, at 813–14.
196. Id.
197. See supra Part V.
198. Michele Estrin Gilman, Legal Accountability in an Era of Privatized Welfare, 89
CALIF. L. REV. 569, 635 (2001).
199. See generally Jason Malone, Derivative Immunity: The Impact of Campbell-Ewald
Co. v. Gomez, 50 CREIGHTON L. REV. 87 (2016).
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government. This includes consumer protection laws such as the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act (FDCPA). The FDCPA exempts government officers or
employees in the performance of official duties, but a majority of courts have held
that this exemption does not apply to federal contractors.200
Eliminating the private contractor role will only be effective if the government
competently fills the void. As discussed in Part V, this is a tremendous challenge
given the inherent conflicts of interest at the Department, lax oversight, and
corruption. Although not the topic of this Article, all proposals to restructure the
federal aid program to eliminate the conflicts of interest and corruption should be
on the table, including splitting up units within the Department of Education to
separate the loan origination, school gatekeeping, and collection roles and/or
considering enlisting other agencies, such as the Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau, to assume the consumer protection role.201
In addition, public and private enforcement agencies and advocates must step
up and fight to put teeth back into constitutional due process rights for borrowers.
As discussed in Part V, borrowers have generally been unsuccessful in challenging
the current hearing process based on constitutional due process claims. This is due
in part to outdated procedural due process jurisprudence.202 Among other concerns,
courts developed these doctrines at a time when private contractor involvement in
the administration of public benefits programs was minimal and, according to some
scholars, there were fewer incentives to terminate beneficiaries from
these programs.203
C. Restructuring the Hearing Process
The government’s current practice of using Department employees as hearing
officials must end. These designated officials are employees of the agency that is
also responsible for collecting funds. This should be considered contrary to the
200. 15 U.S.C. § 1692a (6)(C) (providing exemption for government officers or employees in
the performance of official duties). For cases on Department of Education federal contractors, see, for
example, Brannan v. United Student Aid Funds, Inc., 94 F.3d 1260, 1263 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that
a guaranty agency is not exempt because it is not a government agency or employee). See also Del Campo
v. Am. Corrective Counseling Serv., Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1125 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (holding that
the 2006 amendment to the FDCPA, which added a narrow exemption for private contractors
operating bad check diversion programs, did not evince a general intent that private contractors
operating pretrial diversion programs were never intended to be considered debt collectors); Gradisher
v. Check Enf’t Unit, 133 F. Supp. 2d 988, 992 (W.D. Mich. 2001) (holding that a private corporation
hired by a county to collect on dishonored checks does not meet the government actor exemption as
they are an independent contractor).
201. See. e.g., Michael Stratford, CFPB Eyes ‘Joint’ Supervision of Student Loan Companies with
Education Department, POLITICO (Feb. 6, 2020, 6:57 PM), https://subscriber.politicopro.com/
article/2020/02/cfpb-eyes-joint-supervision-of-student-loan-companies-with-education-department1876051 [ https://perma.cc/QP63-Y4J6 ].
202. See generally Parkin, supra note 172.
203. Id. at 1339; Lens, supra note 51, at 13 (noting that much has changed about the welfare
system since Goldberg, including that welfare is no longer considered an entitlement and it is generally
temporary and work-based).
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Goldberg court’s holding that an impartial decision maker is essential for fair
hearings.204 Further, the Department must provide the identities and backgrounds
of the individuals they hire to act as hearing officials. These reforms will likely
require new regulations and, in some instances, legislation, although some reforms
can be implemented through affirmative executive action.
It is also important to look beyond the existing structure and consider less
formal paths to justice. Formal hearings, with or without legal representation and
even with neutral judges, may simply not be optimal for student loan borrowers.
To test this theory, it is essential to study and evaluate different types of
adjudicatory programs at other government agencies. This should include an
evaluation of the role of legal assistance. Legal assistance can make a huge difference
in hearing outcomes. In immigration hearings, for example, more than eighty
percent of children who appeared in court unrepresented were deported.205 As
of 2014, for children who appeared in court with legal representation, only
twelve percent were deported. 206
Legal representation likely makes a difference for student loan borrowers
requesting hearings as well. In some cases, a borrower presenting a request with a
lawyer may persuade an agency to settle or at least drop the collection action.207 If
the case goes to an actual hearing, the current hearing system makes it particularly
difficult for borrowers without legal representation to succeed. Even though the
hearings are not as formal as court trials, they require an ability to navigate a
confusing system and understand an array of borrower rights. These barriers are
often greatest for borrowers with language access issues or disabilities.
In the current framework, the mere presence of a lawyer is likely to lead to a
better outcome for a borrower. But requiring every person to find a lawyer just to
make sure courts follow the rules places the responsibility with the wrong party.208
Further, free and affordable civil legal services are severely underfunded. In a 2017
survey, the Legal Services Corporation found that about seventy-one percent of
low-income households had experienced at least one civil legal problem in the
previous year. Yet there was inadequate or no legal help for eighty-six percent of
these problems. Those who sought help received only limited or no help more than
half the time.209 While absolutely worth fighting for, the historical trend is going in

204. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 271 (1970) (finding that an impartial decision maker is
essential, but prior involvement in some aspects of a case will not necessarily bar a welfare official from
acting as a decision maker).
205. Misyrlena Egkolfopoulou, The Thousands of Children Who Go to Immigration Court Alone,
A TLANTIC (Aug. 21, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/08/childrenimmigration-court/567490/ [ https://perma.cc/DC3H-RWYT ].
206. Id.
207. See Lens, supra note 51, at 48 (suggesting that the mere request for a hearing can act as a
prod for parties to resolve their own disputes).
208. Rebecca L. Sandefur, Access to What?, 148 DÆDALUS 49, 52 (2019).
209. LEGAL SERVS. CORP., THE JUSTICE GAP: MEASURING THE UNMET CIVIL LEGAL NEEDS
https://www.lsc.gov/sites/default/files/images/
OF LOW-INCOME AMERICANS, 6 (2017),
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the opposite direction, toward steadily reduced funding for free and affordable
legal services.
Limited legal representation is not necessarily fatal to hopes for procedural
justice. Professor Rebecca Sandefur and others have written about ways to expand
forums beyond traditional lawyer-based adversarial hearings, emphasizing that it is
critical to first clarify the goals of the hearings.210 For student loan hearings, the
government must first affirm that the goals of the hearings are to increase access
to justice, not to cut costs or ensure substantial collection rates.
In looking back at the history of fair hearings for public benefits recipients,
some have argued that while Goldberg and subsequent decisions brought critical
procedural rights to many government benefits recipients, courts and policymakers
may have been too quick to adopt an adversarial hearing model rather than
experimenting with more investigative or inquisitorial approaches.211 We should
consider such experiments for student loan borrowers without in any way
compromising borrower rights.
The resulting system could be multilayered with informal programs set up to
resolve straightforward issues, reserving the more formal programs for complex
issues or other cases that cannot be resolved informally. For example, if a borrower
is truly seeking only to raise financial hardship as the basis to suspend or reduce
collection, a neutral, nonprofit counseling or other type of agency could handle and
make determinations about these individual financial issues. For the system to
be effective, there must be robust funding for these services as well as training
and oversight.
Some might argue that the current student loan ombudsman office could serve
this role, but this is not an effective solution to meet procedural justice goals. The
ombudsman website clearly states that they are not a borrower advocate nor intend
to replace regular or formal channels of problem resolution within the Department
or in federal court.212 Most importantly, the ombudsman is based within the
Department’s Federal Student Aid office, part of the very agency that is not only
rife with internal conflicts of interest, but also creates most of the problems
borrowers are seeking to resolve. It is unrealistic to expect the ombudsman to play
the neutral role required to objectively evaluate borrower hardship and related
claims or to have any power to affect more positive outcomes for borrowers.

TheJusticeGap-FullReport.pdf [ https://perma.cc/JUC9-JZC2 ] (finding that about seventy-one
percent of low income households had experienced at least one civil legal problem in the previous year
and eighty-six percent of these problems received inadequate or no legal help, and those who sought
help received only limited or no help more than half the time.).
210. Sandefur & Clarke, supra note 182, at 1474.
211. Parkin, supra note 172, at 1329.
212. If You’re In a Dispute About Your Federal Student Aid, Contact the Federal Student Aid
Ombudsman Group as a Last Resort, FED. STUDENT AID, https://studentaid.gov/feedbackombudsman/disputes/prepare [ https://perma.cc/5FLZ-UYPT ] ( last visited Oct. 3, 2020 ).
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In addition to helping evaluate hardship claims, once a borrower requests a
hearing, there could be a system short of a full hearing to require the government
to present proof of the borrower’s legal obligation to pay. Without such proof, the
government would not be able to move forward. This might look like a system in
New York where creditors are required to provide documentation of the amount
claimed at the time of filing debt collection lawsuits.213 This was a response to the
typical situation in which creditors are allowed to file lawsuits without
documentation of ownership of the debt. The program led to a dramatic drop in
numbers of debt lawsuits.214
In an example of a hybrid formal/informal hearing system, the Department
of Agriculture’s Rural Housing Service (RHS) loan program gives borrowers the
option to request a complete three-stage review of adverse decisions made by
agency personnel or servicers.215 The appeal procedures include (1) an informal
phone conference with the agency staff who made the decision, (2) mediation, and
(3) an on-the-record in-person hearing before a hearing officer.216
It may also be preferable to limit the scope of the student loan hearings so that
the agencies route discharge decisions to specialized units at the Department. The
officials would stay hearings pending discharge decisions. At least until there is
widespread reform, this will help ensure that untrained, biased officials are not
making substantive discharge and related decisions. To make this work effectively,
there must be discharge decision deadlines created through legislation or regulation
so that borrowers are not left in limbo for prolonged periods, as is currently
the case.
It is also important to seriously consider that informal or alternative prehearing
procedures may disadvantage low-income individuals.217 This may be particularly
the case if the informal hearings are mandatory with no way for an individual to
choose a more formal process or if the informal processes are more like formal
hearings in disguise.218 This is an area crying out for more study and evaluation.
VI. SYSTEMIC CHANGE
“When a system is broken, the solution is systemic reform.” —Rebecca Sandefur 219
There is an open question about how much to prioritize procedural rights to
achieve a truly just student aid system. Improving process without tackling systemic
issues is counterproductive and unlikely to succeed.

213. Sandefur & Clarke, supra note 182, at 53.
214. Id.
215. 7 C.F.R. § 11.3(a) (2020) (defining adverse decisions).
216. 7 C.F.R. §§ 11.5–10.
217. Parkin, supra note 172, at 1366 n.272; Lens, supra note 51, at 53.
218. Lens, supra note 51, at 53–54 (warning that alternative and less formal procedures may
work against poorer and more disadvantaged individuals, who may lose procedural protections that
compensate for their lack of power).
219. Sandefur & Clarke, supra note 182, at 52.
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In reconsidering the prior due process reform movement, some critics believe
that the push for benefits hearings ended up harming recipients by masking injustice
without ultimately gaining much in terms of greater benefits.220 Critics also raise
concerns about the lawyer-based, adversarial nature of the hearing process.221
One lesson is to ensure that recipient voices are centered and empowered in
the reform movement. For example, the mostly women of color who led welfare
rights movement fought to change how people understood aid to the poor.222
Current student debt organizing efforts along these lines focus on the right to
education and eliminating the debt-based foundation of our federal student aid
system.
This is essential, but there is still a question whether including borrower voices
can truly disrupt the corruption in the current system. Former Department
employee and whistleblower Jon Oberg has referred to the Department’s revolving
door and related corruption as “the iron triangle.”223 According to Oberg,
An iron triangle at either the state or federal level is a lobbying association’s
dream, always sought and often achieved. One corner is the lobbying
group; another is the staff of an elected official in the legislative branch
with jurisdiction over the subject area; in the third corner are the officials
in the executive branch who administer the relevant government programs.
The goal is to get the lobbying association’s own people in charge of all the
corners. This is done by means of the “revolving door,” through which
like-minded people sympathetic to the lobby group fill and then rotate
among the corner positions, moving from one to another as
opportunities arise.224
Oberg and others call for a different approach to reforming federal student aid,
focusing not on incompetence as the main culprit for the dismal administration, but
on corruption.225
Challenging corruption and restructuring oversight should be coupled with
reforms to eliminate the punitive collection powers and simplify the student aid
220. Parkin, supra note 172, at 1332.
221. Lucie E. White, Goldberg v. Kelly on the Paradox of Lawyering for the Poor, 56
BROOK. L. REV. 861, 872 (1990) (arguing that lawyer-engineered remedies do not challenge the lived
experience of subordination); William E. Forbath, Constitutional Welfare Rights: A History, Critique
and Reconstruction, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1821, 1856 (2001) (citing critiques that the right to a fair
hearing has become a “quintessential lawyer’s process-based reform, easily routinized within the welfare
bureaucracy, its pursuit sapping movement energy and gaining nothing of substance”).
222. See generally Gene Demby, The Mothers Who Fought To Radically Reimagine Welfare, NPR
( June 9, 2019, 9:49 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/codeswitch/2019/06/09/730684320/themothers-who-fought-to-radically-reimagine-welfare [ https://perma.cc/2LKX-BHYC ].
223. Jon H. Oberg, Iron Triangles, Part I, THREE CAPITALS (Dec. 2017),
http://viewfromthreecapitals.blogspot.com/2017/12/pubad-101401.html
[ https://perma.cc/
ZAY5-LDVT ].
224. Id.
225. Jon H. Oberg, Corruption as a Cause of Student Loan Failures, THREE CAPITALS
(Sept. 2019), http://viewfromthreecapitals.blogspot.com/2019/09/corruption-as-cause-studentloan.html [ https://perma.cc/4FYK-5MDB ].
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programs. This should include ending default through automatic payment or other
simplification proposals, ending punitive collection powers such as Social Security
offsets, and implementing safety net reform including restoration of student loan
bankruptcy rights.
These measures are critical, but the most important reform is to move away
from a student aid system based on debt. As long as loans are the centerpiece of
federal aid, the punitive collection agenda will continue to overshadow all other
government priorities.226 A comprehensive analysis is beyond the scope of this
Article, but key components include broad debt cancellation, free public college
programs, banning federal aid to for-profit schools, and providing resources and
structure for rigorous government oversight. 227
CONCLUSION
To build a case for real reform of federal student aid, we must, as professor of
higher education policy and sociology Sara Goldrick-Rab argues, “stop counting
who gets what dollars and think in terms of who gets what benefits . . . . [This] is a
public problem and needs to be treated like one.”228 Ultimately, this will only occur
once there are few or possibly no borrowers in default needing to request collection
hearings in the first place.
In the words of one borrower seeking defense to repayment relief after
attending a fraudulent school:
Nobody can get a straight answer on the status of their loans, and the
Department continues to collect when they’re not supposed to. It crushes
people. We’re stuck. It’s a really difficult place to be, to deal with that
mentally and financially.
In a system that forces you go to go school, it’s really discouraging to
have this experience. It makes you not want to invest in this system that
we’ve been told works for everybody.229
As this borrower attests, denying procedural justice can lead individuals to give
up even trying to seek redress.
The illusion of a fair system can lead to more than a cynical citizenry. It
threatens the very concept of citizenship. As Professor Danielle Allen explains, no
one wants to feel subject to, and “at the mercy of, the will of powerful others, to

226. Loonin & Morgan, supra note 190, at 903–04.
227. See generally Loonin & Morgan, supra note 5.
228. Kanyakrit Vongkiatkajorn, One Bold Way to Blow Up the College Debt Nightmare, MOTHER
JONES (Nov. 6, 2016), https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2016/11/college-costs-financial-aidsara-goldrick-rab/ [ https://perma.cc/LHW2-92YA ].
229. My Student Loan Truth: Amanda’s Everest Institute Story, PROJECT ON PREDATORY
STUDENT LENDING (Oct. 29, 2019), https://predatorystudentlending.org/news/blog/amandaseverest-institute-story-corinthian-colleges/ [ https://perma.cc/7VX2-MHT9 ].
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whom they are invisible.”230 It is worse than nothing for so many borrowers to get
a pretend chance to fight back. We can and must do better.

230. Danielle Allen, The Road from Serfdom: How Americans Can Become Citizens Again,
ATLANTIC (Dec. 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2019/12/danielle-allenamerican-citizens-serfdom/600778/ [ https://perma.cc/Y2FM-YK2H ].

